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Law addresses itself to actualities .... Of course a State need not
equalize economic conditions. A man of means may be able to af-
ford the retention of an expensive, able counsel not within reach
of a poor man's purse. Those are contingencies of life which are
hardly within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to correct
or cushion.'
-Justice Felix Frankfurter
Scholars have long debated the role of poverty in the receipt of
justice.2 Courts have similarly wrestled with adjudication involving
destitute legal actors, beginning as early as 1959. In Burns v Ohio,3 the
Supreme Court ruled that indigent defendants had the right to file no-
tice of appeal without first paying a fee. Burns sparked an entire
progeny of cases surrounding indigent defendants' access to legal
tools; courts soon added to the state-subsidized list rights including:
(a) a trial transcript for use in appeal;- (b) assistance of counsel at
trial;_6 (c) assistance of counsel on first direct appeal;7 and (d) effec-
tiveness of counsel at both trial and appellate levels."
While states are not required to provide all the assistance that a
wealthy litigant may purchase,9 the government is responsible for pro-
viding "meaningful access to justice," which "requires the basic tools
of an adequate defense and appeal.' '. But what constitutes a basic le-
gal tool? In 1985, the Court included among such tools the right to a
competent psychiatric expert when a defendant's sanity is in ques-
t B.A. 1998, Illinois Wesleyan University; 1D. Candidate 2003,The University of Chicago.
I Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12,23 (1956) (Frankfurter concurring).
2 Anatole France aptly noted, "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges." Anatole France, The Red Lily 75 (Modem Library 1917).
3 360 US 252 (1959).
4 See id at 257.
5 See Griffin, 351 US at 19.
6 See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335,342-46 (1963).
7 See Douglas v California, 372 US 353,358-59 (1963).
8 See McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759,771 n 14 (1970).
9 See Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600,612 (1974) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require states to equalize economic conditions).
10 Britt v North Carolina, 404 US 226,227 (1971).
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tion.' Ake v Oklahoma1 2 catalyzed academic commentary;" scholars
asked whether such a right extended to any questioning of mental
state, such as intent, or was limited exclusively to sanity issues.
Building on the Ake foundation, this Comment asks whether an
indigent defendant is entitled to a state-funded battered woman syn-
drome expert. Guided by Ake's balancing test and identifiable factors,
this Comment answers in the affirmative. Part I explains fundamental
background issues, including (A) the Ake decision (which provides the
legal foundation for the issue at hand) and (B) the psychological the-
ory of battered woman syndrome. Part II details how courts and aca-
demics have approached the theory and its legal applications; this Part
explores both statistical patterns and conceptual divisions of case out-
comes. Finally, Part III proposes that states fund battered woman syn-
drome expert testimony for indigent defendants whenever mental
state is in question.
I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES: AKE V OKLAHOMA AND BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME THEORY
An examination of whether indigent defendants are entitled to a
state-provided battered woman syndrome (BWS) expert" requires a
review of relevant judicial and psychological background. To question
the boundaries of Ake, one must know its basic contours; thus, Part
I.A begins with a detailed review of Ake and its reasoning. After out-
lining the case facts, this Part articulates the two key decisional ap-
proaches of the Ake Court: (1) the balancing test and (2) relevant fac-
tors.
Part I.B then adds psychological theory to this judicial back-
ground with a review of battered woman syndrome. This Part intro-
11 See Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68,83 (1985).
12 470 US 68 (1985).
13 See, for example, David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain
Beyond Reach for the Indigent, 68 NC L Rev 763, 764 (1990) (arguing that an appropriate inter-
pretation of Ake must employ a standard based on reasonableness and allow the indigent defen-
dant some measure of participation in the choice of expert); Mark P. Goodman, Note, The Right
to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency Preclude Insanity?, 61 NYU L Rev 703, 706
(1986) (concluding that the Ake analysis implicitly granted indigents the right to a partisan psy-
chiatrist); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Consti-
tutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 Mich L Rev 1326,1345 (1986) (arguing that the right to
expert assistance under Ake should extend as far as the right to counsel); The Supreme Court,
1984 Term: L Constitutional Law, 99 Harv L Rev 120, 137 (1985) (suggesting that expert testi-
mony will be crucial and thus required for indigents under Ake whenever a defense is novel or
not understood by the lay population).
14 As I use the term throughout the Comment, "battered woman syndrome expert" con-
notes a general psychiatrist capable of BWS examination and diagnosis, in contrast to one who
specializes in the syndrome. For an analysis concluding that this is the minimal, and appropriate,
scope of the Ake decision, see text accompanying notes 170-73.
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duces three distinct phases accompanying most abusive relationships
and explains their influence upon victim characteristics. The Part con-
cludes by explaining how BWS theory is used to support a battered
woman's legal claim of self-defense.
A. Psychiatric Expert Foundation: Ake v Oklahoma
Glen Burton Ake was arrested in late 1979 and charged with
murdering a couple and wounding their two children." Based on sev-
eral incidents in jail and Ake's "bizarre" behavior at arraignment, the
district court judge ordered that the defendant be examined by a psy-
chiatrist. 6 The examining psychiatrist diagnosed Ake as a probable
paranoid schizophrenic and recommended prolonged psychiatric
evaluation; 7 Ake was committed to a state hospital and declared in-
competent to stand trial. '8 However, state proceedings quickly re-
sumed after hospital psychiatrists placed Ake on medication and re-
classified him as competent.' 9
At pretrial conference, Ake's attorney announced that the defen-
dant would raise an insanity defense and requested that the court pro-
vide psychiatric evaluation for the indigent defendant;2' the court de-
nied the motion.2' Ake was then tried for two counts of murder with
the sole defense of insanity. During trial, defense counsel questioned
hospital psychiatrists, but none were able to testify about his mental
state at the time of the alleged crime." Ultimately, there was no expert
testimony for either the prosecution or defense as to Ake's mental
state at the time of the offense, and Ake was convicted on all counts.
At sentencing, the state asked for the death penalty, relying upon the
hospital psychiatrists' testimony to establish that Ake would be dan-
gerous in the future.2 Ake presented no expert witnesses to rebut this
testimony or to provide evidence in mitigation of punishment;24 he was
subsequently sentenced to death on each of the murder counts.2'
15 Ake, 470 US at 70.
16 Idat71.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Id at 71-72.
20 During Ake's three-month stay at the state hospital, no inquiry had been made into his
sanity at the time of the offense. See id at 72.
21 Id. The district court denied the motion based on Smith v Baldi, 344 US 561,568 (1953)
(holding that states are not required to appoint a psychiatrist for pretrial examination of an indi-
gent defendant when the issue of sanity is heard by the trial court).
22 Id at 72.
23 Id at 73.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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In reversing these convictions, the Supreme Court emphasized
the state's responsibility to provide "meaningful access to justice" to
indigent defendants.6 The Court discussed when, and under what con-
ditions, psychiatric participation in defense preparation is important
enough to require state funding.n The Court resolved this issue for
both the trial and sentencing phases through the use of (1) an explicit
balancing test and (2) additional relevant factors of consideration. The
Court utilized the balancing test to first determine whether the right
existed in principle; it then applied the additional factors to determine
whether Ake specifically could claim this right.2
1. Ake balancing test.
In order to examine when psychiatric expertise is necessary to de-
fense preparation, the Court utilized the balancing test of Mathews v
Eldridgen to determine the state's obligation under the Due Process
Clause. The test weighs the following three factors: (1) the nature of
the private interest that will be affected by the action of the state; (2)
the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be
provided; and (3) the probable value of the additional or substitute
procedural safeguard sought and the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the affected interest if such a safeguard is not provided."
The Court first applied the test to the issue of Ake's sanity at the
time the crime was committed. Examining the private interest of the
defendant, the Court emphasized the obvious and weighty concern of
erroneous conviction: "The private interest in the accuracy of a crimi-
nal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is al-
most uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by
26 Id at 77. The Court cited a string of cases establishing that states must assure a defendant
fair opportunity to present a defense, see id at 76, including Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956)
(holding states must provide a trial transcript to indigent criminal defendants if necessary to a
decision on the merits of an appeal); Burns v Ohio, 360 US 252 (1959) (waiving an appeal filing
fee for indigent defendants); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963) (entitling an indigent de-
fendant to the assistance of counsel at trial); Douglas v California, 372 US 353 (1963) (entitling
an indigent defendant to counsel on her first direct appeal); Little v Streater, 452 US 1 (1981)
(providing an indigent defendant in a paternity action with blood-grouping tests).
27 See Ake, 470 US at 77.
28 See id.
29 424 US 319,355 (1976). Although Mathews was a civil case, its test has been employed in
criminal contexts as well. See, for example, Schall v Martin, 467 US 253, 263 (1984) (upholding
the pretrial detention of juveniles on finding a willingness to commit subsequent crimes); Hewitt
v Helms, 459 US 460,473 (1983) (denying a prisoner's request for a hearing before being placed
in administrative segregation).
30 See Ake, 470 US at 77. For further discussion of this balancing test, see text accompany-
ing notes 44-49.
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this Court over the years to diminish the risk of erroneous conviction
stands as a testament to that concern."'"
The Court was not persuaded that the relevant state interests
were similarly significant. While recognizing a state interest in econ-
omy of judicial process, Ake concluded that minimal financial burdens
would be imposed if the right were limited to a single psychiatrist, as
already available in many state and government prosecutions.n The
Court additionally noted that any state interest in prevailing at trial is
tempered by the interests of fair and accurate adjudication, ultimately
rendering the government interest in denying psychiatric assistance
"not substantial."33
Inquiring into the probable value of psychiatric assistance and
risk of error in its absence, the Court endorsed the role of psychiatrists
in criminal proceedings.' Again referencing state and federal practices
of psychiatric provision,n' the Court explained that the psychiatrist's
"pivotal" role enables a jury to reach the "most accurate determina-
tion of truth."' Able to gather facts, interview, analyze, draw conclu-
sions, and offer opinions, psychiatrists can (a) know the probative
questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to in-
terpret their responses; (b) identify symptoms of insanity that elude
the layperson; and (c) translate medical diagnoses into language with
meaning for the trier of fact.- Careful to neither "approve nor disap-
prove [of] widespread reliance on psychiatrists," the Court instead
recognized a substantial probable value in the use of psychiatric assis-
tance in light of evolving practice.s The Court concluded that the ab-
31 Ake, 470 US at 78. This list of safeguards includes those outlined in note 26.
32 See id at 79 ("More than 40 States, as well as the Federal Government, have decided ei-
ther through legislation or judicial decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under certain
circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise.").
33 Id at 78.
34 See id at 79-81, 84 ("[In some cases] a defense may be devastated by the absence of a
psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a reason-
able chance of success.").
35 See id at 79. See also id at 82 n 8, quoting Irving Goldstein and Fred Lane, Goldstein
Trial Techniques § 14.01 (Callaghan 2d ed 1969) ("Modem civilization, with its complexities of
business, science, and the professions, has made expert and opinion evidence a necessity.").
36 Id at 79, 81.
37 See id at 81. For a discussion of the role of psychiatrists in presenting expert evidence,
see Peter R. Dahl, Comment, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of Psychiatric Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 73 Cal L Rev 411,419-39 (1985) (outlining the uses of psychiatric knowledge
within the law); Joel E Henning, The Psychiatrist in the Legal Process, in Lawrence Z. Freedman,
ed, By Reason of Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the Law 217, 219-20 (Scholarly Resources
1983) (discussing the growing role of psychiatric witnesses as a result of changing definitions of
legal insanity and increased judicial and legislative acceptance of the practice).
33 See Ake,470 US at 81-82.
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sence of psychiatric assistance would create an "extremely high" risk
of inaccurate resolution. 9
The Court qualified its conclusion, however, by finding it
"unlikely" that psychiatric assistance would be of probable value if a
defendant's mental condition is not an issue.40 The Court elaborated:
The risk of error from denial of such assistance is most predicta-
bly at its height when the defendant's mental condition is seri-
ously in question. When the defendant is able to make an ex parte
threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a
significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a
psychiatrist is readily apparent. 1
When sanity is a factor in the defense, the Court concluded that states
must assure an indigent defendant access to a psychiatrist for exami-
nation and "assistance in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of
the defense. 4 2 The Court left states to implement the right on their
own terms, denying that defendants have the right to choose their own
psychiatrist or receive funds to hire the same.43
The Court concluded that the balancing test weighed in favor of
providing psychiatric assistance for indigent defendants such as Ake
during trial." The Court similarly determined that the right to psychi-
atric assistance extends to capital sentencing proceedings when a de-
fendant's future dangerousness is at issue.45 Recall that Ake presented
no psychiatric experts to rebut the state's psychiatric testimony estab-
lishing his future dangerousness;4 applying the Mathews three-prong
balancing test, the Court found this unconstitutional.4 The Court rec-
ognized both individual and state interests in preventing an erroneous
imposition of the death penalty. It noted that the practice of permit-
ting psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness rests on the as-
sumption that the factfinder will hear testimony from both parties.
Consequently, the Court believed that any defendant denied such tes-
timony would lose a significant opportunity to raise questions about
39 Id.
40 Id at 82.
41 Id at 82-83.
42 Id at 83.
43 See id:
This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose
a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that
the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have dis-
cussed, and as in the case on provision of counsel we leave to the states the decision on how
to implement this right.
44 See id at 84.
45 See id.
46 See id at 73. See text accompanying notes 23-25.
47 See Ake, 470 US at 83-84.
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the state's proof of an aggravating factor.4' Thus, in the sentencing
phase, "where the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of
responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the
State so slim," due process requires access to psychiatric examination,
testimony, and assistance in preparation.4 9
2. Ake's additional relevant factors.
After establishing that indigent defendants may, in certain cir-
cumstances, be entitled to psychiatric assistance, the Court went on to
determine that Ake specifically qualified for the provision of psychiat-
ric services." The Court identified several factors in support of its deci-
sion that Ake's mental state at the time of the offense was in fact a
substantial factor in his defense.' Relevant factors included the
following: (a) Ake's sole defense was insanity; (b) Ake's behavior was
so bizarre that the trial court had ordered a competency examination;
(c) the state psychiatrist had found Ake incompetent to stand trial; (d)
when Ake was finally declared competent, it was only on the condi-
tion of large-dose drug sedation; (e) the examining psychiatrist had
described Ake's mental illness as severe; and (f) the state placed the
production burden of an insanity defense upon the defendant. 2 De-
spite these numerous factors, the scope of relevant consideration was
left uncertain: "We express no opinion as to whether any of these fac-
tors, alone or in combination, is necessary to make this finding."'"
A lone dissent by then Justice Rehnquist contested the Ake ma-
jority's conclusions.54 Justice Rehnquist emphasized the majority's re-
quirement that an indigent defendant make "a preliminary showing
that sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor
at trial"" before receiving a state-appointed psychiatrist. M Questioning
whether Ake was truly insane," the dissent insisted that Ake had failed
to demonstrate such a "preliminary showing," since the defense intro-
duced no evidence on Ake's mental state during the murders.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See id at 86-87.
51 See id at 86.
52 See id.
53 Id at 86 n 12.
54 See id at 87-92 (Rehnquist dissenting).
55 Id at 74.
56 Id at 90 (Rehnquist dissenting).
57 Justice Rehnquist suggested that the evidence of Ake's month-long crime spree, coupled
with a detailed confession and the testimony of a cellmate who quoted Ake as revealing he was
going to "play crazy," cast serious doubts on Ake's claim to mental instability. See id at 90-91.
58 Id at 92. Rehnquist must have believed that the declaration of an insanity defense was
insufficient to trigger significant focus on mental state at trial, a belief in contradiction with the
very definition of insanity. Indeed, the dissent effectively argued that an indigent defendant must
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Justice Rehnquist further asserted that the majority's creation of
a right to psychiatric assistance in defense evaluation, preparation, and
presentation impermissibly creates an advocate.' 9 The dissent con-
tended that even assuming the right to a state-appointed psychiatrist
existed, the defendant should have access only to a competent opin-
ion, not one that necessarily opposes the views of the prosecution's
expert.64 "A psychiatrist is not an attorney, whose job it is to advo-
cate.'
61
To Justice Rehnquist's dismay, Ake requires that when a new de-
fendant demonstrates that his or her sanity at the time of the offense
is a significant factor at trial, the state must assure the defendant ac-
cess to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate ex-
amination and assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation
of the defense.62
B. Battered Woman Syndrome Theory
Understanding the theory of BWS is crucial to determining
whether Ake's analysis supports extending the indigent expert provi-
sion to BWS evidence. This Part presents a detailed review of BWS
theory in order to later compare and contrast the role of the BWS ex-
pert with that of the psychiatrist supported in Ake.4
In 1979, Dr. Lenore Walker published The Battered Woman, a
groundbreaking book positing the existence of a "battered woman
syndrome.6' Walker documented psychological research upon female
victims of domestic violence and identified common behavioral pat-
terns exhibited by battered women. In the past two decades, the in-
corporation of Walker's research into the paradigm of self-defense
theory has been both praised and criticized by legal and social science
scholars.6 Because victims of BWS who assault their batterers tend to
prove he is insane before he can get a psychiatrist to tell him so.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Id. This argument is addressed further in Part III.C in the specific context of BWS. See
text accompanying notes 170-73.
62 See Ake, 470 US at 83.
63 See Part III.
64 See Lenore E.Walker, The Battered Woman (Harper 1979).
65 Compare Julie Blackman, Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Repre-
sentation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 Women's Rts L Rep 227,231 (1986) (supporting BWS
evidence as an "alternative form of reasonableness" that includes more relevant situational fac-
tors), with Marilyn McMahon, Battered Women and Bad Science: The Limited Validity and Utility
of Battered Woman Syndrome, 6 Psychiatry, Psych, & L 23, 23-49 (1999) (identifying methodo-
logical deficiencies in key empirical studies on which the syndrome is based), David L. Faigman
and Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 Ariz L Rev 67, 68
(1997) (criticizing judicial acceptance of the theory without further empirical foundation), and
Donald A. Downs, More Than Victims: Battered Women, The Syndrome Society, and the Law 138-
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do so during nonconfrontational moments, they have a difficult time
meeting the legal requirements of the self-defense doctrine, which fo-
cuses on the necessity of proportional force in response to imminent
harm.6 BWS can illuminate how a victim might perceive these re-
quirements, even when not under immediate attack due to (1) the bat-
tering cycle and (2) learned helplessness.
1. The battering cycle.
According to the theory of battered woman syndrome, three dis-
tinct phases typify most battering relationships.67 The relationship be-
gins in a "tension building" phase, marked by verbal bickering and in-
creasing tension between partners. Soon the relationship erupts into
an "acute battering incident" in which the batterer explodes into un-
controllable and violent rage, harming the relationship partner. Fi-
nally, the couple enters the "loving contrition" stage, in which the bat-
terer expresses complete regret, continually apologizes, and promises
to change his or her future behavior.6' These three steps repeat each
other, forming a cycle of violence in which the victim is reduced to a
constant state of fear and anxiety identified as "cumulative terror."'
'
6
Within the legal context, the cycle theory addresses two compo-
nents of successful self-defense claims when a battered woman harms
her abuser: 7 (1) fear of imminent harm7 1 and (2) proportional response
to harm.2 The defendant's knowledge of the aggressor's history, cou-
82 (Chicago 1996) (concluding that "the syndrome connection is a problematic way" to accom-
plish the task of legally recognizing battered women's self-defense claims and exploring specific
problems associated with BWS).
66 See Downs, More Than Victims at 3 (cited in note 65):
The law of self-defense is based on a rather strict presence of necessity: it requires that the
defender use deadly force only if threat of death or great bodily harm is imminent or pres-
ently impending, and that the response be reasonable, apportioned to the extent or quality
of the threat.
See also notes 71-72.
67 See Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 126-38 (Springer 2d ed 2000). It
is worth noting that although Walker's BWS research and theories typically involve a male bat-
terer, theoretically, the syndrome could occur even when the batterer is female.
63 See id at 126-27.
69 Id.
70 See Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 73 (cited in note 65). For a useful summary of
traditional self-defense doctrines developed to address the issues of BWS theory, see Jeffrey B.
Murdoch, Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 20 N Ill U L Rev 191,194-98 (2000).
71 See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 18.01(B) (Mathew Bender 3d ed
2001) ("[D]eadly force is only justified in self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its
use is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor.") (em-
phasis omitted).
72 See id at § 18.01(D) ("[A] person is not justified in using force that is excessive in reac-
tion to the harm threatened.").
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pled with her physical inability to protect herself, explain how a bat-
tered woman could feel imminent harm even when her abuser is not
attacking her. These factors may suggest to a trier of fact how a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's position might have perceived a ne-
cessity to fight back, because she perceived imminent harm, even
though those not experiencing BWS would not.n In suggesting con-
stant fear of serious harm, the cycle theory also accounts for why a se-
rious (and potentially deadly) response is proportional to the threat of
harm.74
2. Victims' learned helplessness.
In order to support a self-defense theory, many states require a
defendant to retreat from harm if possible.7 The cycle theory cannot
initially explain why a woman with BWS does not retreat from her
abuser. However, Walker offers a theory of "learned helplessness" to
explain why battered women do not merely leave the abusive rela-
tionship.7 6
The theory of learned helplessness was first developed by psy-
chologist Martin Seligman, who discovered that laboratory dogs ex-
posed to shock "learn" that they are helpless and thus fail to escape
even when provided with an opportunity to do so;" Seligman later
generalized this phenomenon to depression in humans.78 As applied to
battered women, the theory posits that victims "learn" after repeated
abuse that they cannot control nor escape their partner's violence."
Walker likened the experience to electric shocks, which reduce the
motivation to respond.n This experience, coupled with the batterer's
73 See, for example, Ibn-Tamas v US, 407 A2d 626, 634 (DC 1979) (describing how BWS
expert testimony could substantiate imminent harm by explaining the psychological effects of a
husband's prolonged physical abuse upon a wife's perception of danger); People v Wilson, 194
Mich App 599,487 NW2d 822,824 (1992) (permitting BWS expert testimony to explain how the
battered spouse reacts to the batterer, including the reasonableness of the battered spouse's per-
ception that danger or great bodily harm is imminent).
74 See Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 73 (cited in note 65). See, for example,
Lumpkin v Ray, 977 F2d 508, 509 (10th Cir 1992) (discussing the relevance of proportionality
when the batterer is larger than his victim). See also Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-
Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U Pa L Rev 379, 392 n 34,
419 (1991).
75 See Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law at § 18.02(C)(2) (cited in note 71) ("If a per-
son can safely retreat and, therefore, avoid killing the aggressor, deadly force is unnecessary.").
76 See Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome at 116-17 (cited in note 67).
77 See generally Martin E.P. Seligman, et al, Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog,
73 J Abnormal Psych 256 (1968).
78 See generally Martin E.P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and
Death (W.H. Freeman 1975).
79 See Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome at 116-18 (cited in note 67) (discussing the the-
ory, research, and criticisms of learned helplessness).
80 See id at 118.
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profuse apologies and repeated promises to change during the loving
contrition phase, explains why a victim remains in the relationship. In
legal terms, learned helplessness shows why the BWS victim does not
retreat from the threat of harm as could be required by state law."'
In summary, the battered woman syndrome derives from a three-
stage cyclic relationship of (a) tension building, (b) acute battering,
and (c) loving contrition that creates in the victim a hyper-vigilant,
continuous fear and negates the motivation to leave the abusive rela-
tionship.
H. LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME EVIDENCE
Combining the Ake decision and BWS psychological theory, this
Part examines how the two have interacted in actual cases. Courts
were initially reluctant to accept expert testimony on BWSn based on
prominent criticisms of the theory's empirical foundations. However,
the most recent analysis of the issue suggests that such testimony has
been admitted as evidence to some degree in all fifty states.M Part II.A
details the role BWS evidence has played in legal proceedings and in-
cludes statistics on presentation frequency across states and criminal
81 See Dunn v Roberts, 963 F2d 308,313-14 (10th Cir 1992) (permitting use of BWS expert
testimony to explain why a defendant suffering from BWS would not leave her batterer); State v
Hodges, 716 P2d 563,567 (Kan 1986):
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay per-
son's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. The
expert evidence would counter any "common sense" conclusions by the jury that if the
beatings were really that bad the women would've left her husband much earlier.
82 The first case to admit evidence of BWS was Ibn-Tamas v United States, 497 A2d 626
(DC 1979). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that BWS could assist the
trier of fact in judging the self-defense claim of a battered woman who shot her husband. See id
at 635. For a historical review of judicial acceptance of BWS evidence, see Downs, More Than
Victims at 77-80 (cited in note 65). See also Cynthia L. Coffee, Note, A Trend Emerges:A State
Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J
Fain L 373 (1986-87) (discussing states admitting versus not admitting BWS evidence).
83 See note 65.
84 See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 Wis Women's L J 75, 83 (1996). See also National Institute of Justice, The Va-
lidity and Use of Evidence Concerning Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials: Report
Responding to Section 40507 of the Violence Against Women Act, NCJ 160972 (May 1996), cited
in Clare Dalton and Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and the Law 746 (Foundation 2001)
(concluding the same, and that almost 70 percent of states have found generic BWS expert tes-
timony admissible in order to explain battering and its effects generally). Within federal courts,
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome has been admitted under the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 18 USC § 3006A(e)(1) (1982), permitting courts to authorize necessary "investiga-
tive, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense" where defendants are finan-
dally unable to pay for them. State courts have admitted such testimony under similar state stat-
utes authorizing expert assistance to indigent defendants. See Parrish, 11 Wfis Women's L J at 83.
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categories. Part II.B then examines specific controversies involving
indigent defendants and BWS expert testimony.
A. Empirical Development of BWS Evidence
Battered woman syndrome has been identified as "an enor-
mously elastic concept that can cover a -wide variety of difficult
cases' '8 and, as such, has been utilized across numerous criminal and
civil contexts. BWS is most readily accepted in cases in which the vic-
tim attacks or kills her abuser and asserts self-defense. As of 1996,
96 percent of states permit BWS testimony in fact patterns in which
the victim killed in response to an advancing abuser, while 30 percent
of states admitted such testimony where a battered woman killed a
sleeping abuser.u Battered woman syndrome testimony has been al-
lowed in other criminal contexts as well, including as support for and
against arguments of diminished capacity/lack of intent;' duress;
child abuse;9 sentencing;'o and credibility.9' Within civil contexts, BWS
testimony has been utilized in at least 20 percent of states,2 in cases
involving family law, divorce, and custodial rights issues.9
85 Faigman and Wright, 39 Ariz L Rev at 104 (cited in note 65).
86 Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 105 (cited in note 84). Compare Dalton and Schneider,
Battered Women and the Law at 746 (cited in note 84) (concluding as of 1995 that nearly 70 per-
cent of courts find BWS expert testimony relevant to a self-defense claim). For a voluminous list
of states and cases accepting BWS testimony for self-defense justification, see Parrish, 11 Wis
Women's L J at 104-05 n 47,130 n 172 (cited in note 84).
87 Thirty percent of states have permitted BWS within this context. Dalton and Schneider,
Battered Women and the Law at 746 (cited in note 84); Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 124 n 131
(cited in note 84).
88 Sixteen percent of states have allowed BWS evidence to support arguments of duress,
while 10 percent of states have refused. Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 109 nn 61-62 (cited in
note 84). Compare Dalton and Schneider, Battered Women and the Law at 746 (cited in note 84)
(concluding that two-thirds of states permit BWS testimony concerning acts performed under
duress).
89 Courts in at least three states (Nebraska, New York, and West Virginia) have discussed
BWS and its influence upon the mother's failure to take protective action; more have precluded
the use of expert testimony for this purpose. See Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 123 nn 128-29
(cited in note 84).
90 Twenty percent of states permit BWS testimony to demonstrate the existence of mitigat-
ing factors in sentencing. See Dalton and Schneider, Battered Women and the Law at 746 (cited
in note 84); See Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 125 n 140,130 n 180 (cited in note 84).
91 Approximately 25 percent of states accept BWS testimony to support credibility. Parrish,
11 Wis Women's L J at 124-25 n 136,130 n 176 (cited in note 84). See also Dalton and Schneider,
Battered Women and the Law at 746 (cited in note 84).
92 Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 110 n 66 (cited in note 84).
93 Only a few states have explicitly found BWS expert testimony relevant to these issues.
See id at 123 n 129,126 n 145.
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B. Common Law Treatment of BWS Experts in Indigent Contexts
Few courts have addressed, much less agreed, whether Ake re-
quires state funding of battered woman syndrome expert testimony.
Courts that have split on the issue have at least taken similar ap-
proaches to the analysis. For example, the mental context to be ad-
dressed by the BWS testimony is relevant to the case outcome. In ad-
dition, the presence or absence of a defendant competency examina-
tion and the source of the expert's appointment also influence the de-
cision.
1. Context of mental state addressed by BWS expert testimony.
In all cases to date that addressed whether Ake accords an indi-
gent the right to BWS experts, the defendants stood accused of homi-
cide. The courts were amenable to state provision of an expert where
the defense sought BWS testimony regarding the mental state of the
defendant at the time of the crime, which would nullify the criminal
intent necessary for homicide.
In People v Evans,9' an Illinois appellate court focusing on crimi-
nal intent concluded that a BWS expert is a "necessary expert wit-
ness" and mandated state funding for an indigent who shot her abu-
sive husband as he approached her." The Evans court required a dem-
onstration that (a) expert services were necessary to prove a "crucial
issue" in the case and (b) lack of funds would prejudice the defen-
dant.Y In Evans, the court declared that BWS testimony was necessary
to establish the crucial issue of state of mind at the time of the killing."
The court emphasized that the testimony could not only determine
the scope of culpability (self-defense versus murder versus involun-
tary manslaughter) but could also explain why the defendant might
fear imminent harm from the approach of an unarmed man.99
94 See Dunn v Roberts, 963 F2d 308,314 (10th Cir 1992) (ordering a new trial for a woman
convicted of aiding and abetting multiple murders committed by her abusive boyfriend); State v
Dannels, 226 Mont 80, 734 P2d 188, 197 (1987) (affirming the defendant's deliberate homicide
conviction for a hired hit on her husband); Ledford v State, 254 Ga 656,333 SE2d 576,577 (1986)
(affirming a murder conviction of wife who shot and burned her abusive spouse); People v Ev-
ans, 271 M11 App 3d 495, 648 NE2d 964, 971 (1995) (reversing a conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter for a woman who shot her approaching husband); State v Aucoin, 756 SW2d 705, 716
(Tenn Crim App 1988) (affirming the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder for shooting
her batterer as he slept).
95 271 Ill App 3d 495,648 NE2d 964 (1995).
96 Id at 968-69.
97 Id.
9s See id at 969.The court did not identify what specific state of mind would be necessary.
99 See id (explaining that BWS testimony would be crucial to showing that the approach of
defendant's unarmed husband could justifiably elicit a lethal response from her based upon their
history).
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Evans identified the "crucial" issue of homicidal intent as the fac-
tor requiring indigent access to BWS testimony.' ' Two other state
courts also relied on similar reasoning to deny the requested funds. In
Ledford v State,'°' the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a lower
court refusal to grant funds to an indigent defendant for BWS testi-
mony.' The defendant admitted to killing and burning her batterer, as
well as staging a burglary after the murder to evade suspicion. °' At
trial, the defendant sought provision of an expert to testify specifically
on BWS; the district judge instead ordered her examined for compe-
tency and degree of criminal responsibility. On appeal, Georgia's
highest court affirmed the judge's refusal to grant the defendant funds
for further psychiatric evaluation, reasoning that this initial psychiatric
examination was sufficient to cover the issue of intent: "[The trial
court's] order contemplates an examination that could relate to bat-
tered women's syndrome."105 The Tennessee Court of Criminal Ap-
peals used similar reasoning in State v Aucoin. While awaiting pre-
trial proceedings for killing her batterer, Aucoin was examined by a
clinical psychologist and gave notice that she would assert the insanity
defense.'0 ' Defense counsel requested funds to hire a private BWS ex-
pert for further explanation, refusing the district attorney's offer to
utilize a court-appointed doctor.' The district judge denied Aucoin's
request, and the appellate court affirmed.' ' The court emphasized that
the defendant was not entitled to choose her own psychiatrist and had
failed to take advantage of the court-appointed expert offered to
her."0 Further, the court did not believe defendant's case was preju-
diced, because the original clinical psychologist had eventually testi-
fied on behalf of the defendant."'
State provision of BWS expert testimony has also been endorsed
to address the question of intent in a compulsion defense to a charge
of homicide.12 In the only federal case to address the issue of BWS ex-
100 See id.
101 254 Ga 656,333 SE2d 576 (1986).
102 Id at 577.
103 Id at 576-77.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 756 SW2d 705 (Tenn Crim App 1988).
107 See id at 712-13.
10 Id at 713.
109 Id at 714.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 In a compulsion defense, "the defendant must prove that 'because of mental disease in-
jury, or congenital deficiency, [she] acted as [she] did because of a delusional compulsion as to
such act which overmastered [her] will to resist committing the crime."' Mincey v Head, 206 F3d
1106,1139 (11th Cir 2000), quoting Ga Code Ann § 16-3-3 (Lexis 1999).
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pert assistance under Ake, the Tenth Circuit in Dunn v Roberts W sup-
ported government funding of testimony for a woman prosecuted as
an accomplice to her boyfriend's crimes. The court affirmed a federal
district court order providing a BWS expert to testify to the necessary
mental state for a compulsion defense.11 4 Despite the fact that the de-
fendant had not raised the issues of competence or insanity, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that state-funded BWS testimony was mandated
because it would be significant in rebutting the requisite intent for aid-
ing and abetting."' The state's aiding and abetting theory required it to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically in-
tended to assist her boyfriend in committing crimes.'1 6 The state thus
asked the jury to infer the defendant's specific intent from her contin-
ued presence with her boyfriend throughout his crime spree.'1 7 BWS
expert testimony was therefore relevant because it could provide an
alternative reason for the woman's continued presence (learned help-
lessness), which involved no such intent."8
Courts appear unwilling to extend state provision of BWS testi-
mony to a defendant seeking to bolster her credibility. In State v Dan-
nels,"9 the defendant was in a hotel room with her allegedly abusive
husband when someone broke into the room and killed him. The sub-
sequent crime investigation suggested that the defendant had hired
the killer and assisted in staging the robbery.'2 During questioning, the
defendant claimed that bruises found in a medical examination were
inflicted during the robbery; in fact, the bruises were too old to be the
result of the crime.'2 1 Prior to trial, defense counsel requested funds for
a BWS expert who could explain why a battered woman would lie
about the source of her injuries;22 the request was denied." "The Mon-
tana Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that funds for BWS exper-
tise are not accessible where the testimony is to be used to bolster
credibility (to show why the defendant lied).' 4
113 963 F2d 308 (10th Cir 1992).
114 See id at 313.
115 See id.
116 See id, quoting State v McDaniel, 228 Kan 172, 612 P2d 1231, 1238 (1980) ("Mere asso-
ciation ... or mere presence in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider
and abettor.").
117 See Dunn, 963 F2d at 313.
118 See id at 313-14 (suggesting that such evidence could solve the "mystery" of why the
defendant remained despite repeated abuse).
119 226 Mont 80,734 P2d 188 (1987).
120 Id at 191-92.
121 Id at 192.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See id at 192-93 ("Defendant did not seek to prove that she suffered from abused
spouse syndrome and, as a result, did not have the necessary state of mind to commit the homi-
cide. Rather, defendant planned to use the syndrome as an explanation for the reason she lied ...
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2. Prior examination history and expert appointment.
Another factor considered by at least one court examining an in-
digent right to BWS expert testimony is the presence of a competency
examination. As previously mentioned, Ledford denied further fund-
ing for BWS evaluation where the defendant had already received a
state-ordered competency examination, concluding this examination
was sufficient to provide relevant BWS evaluation and testimony. '
One court has suggested that any potential BWS examination,
whether limited to purposes of competency or covering a broader psy-
chiatric examination, is confined to court-appointed doctors."" In
Aucoin, although the district attorney agreed to an examination by a
court-appointed doctor, defense counsel refused and instead insisted
that the defendant had a right to independent examination by private
doctors of her own choosing' Rejecting this argument, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that the scope of Ake did not extend to a defen-
dant's right to choose his or her own expert: "[A]n accused clearly has
no right to a 'psychiatric advocate." '' Rather, the court found that
once a defendant has some form of psychiatric assistance, further spe-
cialized help is not required."n
III. SOLUTION: THE APPLICATION OF AKE TO BWS
Of these few cases that address state funding of battered woman
expert evidence, most converge on the conclusion that indigent defen-
dants have a right to psychiatric assistance in specific situations. How-
ever, what is the underlying principle to that right, and consequently,
to what extent should such a right, if granted, be limited? As discussed
in Part II.B, courts granting indigent access to BWS testimony rely on
Ake and its focus on the defendant's mental state. Part III.A applies
the Ake balancing test and III.B applies the additional relevant factors
to this specific context. After demonstrating that Ake's balancing test
and relevant factors support indigent access to BWS experts, Part
III.C of the Comment concludes that BWS testimony should be
funded for indigent defendants when it is utilized to nullify the mental
state of any element of an alleged offense.
to buttress her credibility."). The court additionally presented a state statute limiting evidence of
mental disease to circumstances where "it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not
have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." Id at 192.
125 See 333 SE2d at 577. See text accompanying notes 101-05.
126 See Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 713.
127 See id.
128 Id at 714, quoting Collins v State, 506 SW2d 179,187 (Tenn Crim App 1973).
129 See Aucion, 756 SW2d at 714.
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A. The Ake Balancing Test
As applied to BWS experts, Ake's three-prong balancing test of
(1) the private interest; (2) the state interest; and (3) the probable
value and risks of the procedural safeguard at issue, supports state
funding for indigent defendants. Within all three prongs, the interests
and risks involved with the denial of BWS expert funding parallel
those of psychiatric funding in Ake.
1. The individual interest.
The individual interest involved with BWS funding in the crimi-
nal context is equivalent to that recognized in Ake. As Ake concluded,
any private interest in criminal proceedings is "obvious and weighs
heavily"'  for two reasons: (1) the accuracy of criminal proceedings is
"uniquely compelling" because it places an individual's life and liberty
at risk,"' and (2) the many judicial safeguards against an erroneous
conviction support this concern."2 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly
held that with a greater magnitude of potential loss, a defendant is en-
titled to greater due process protections."' Since most BWS experts
are summoned in cases of assault or homicide,'" the accompanying
threat of incarceration would represent significant potential loss and,
thus, demand the due process protection of a necessary BWS expert.
Even if state funding of BWS expert testimony is not designated
a fundamental right of indigent defendants, the fact that the Court
supports flexibility and context-specificity of due process rights would
permit such funding to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The
Court has pronounced:
Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of
the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the uni-
versal sense of justice, may in other circumstances, and in the
light of other considerations, fall short of such denial. '
130 470 US at 78.
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 See, for example, Little v Streater, 452 US 1, 13 (1981) (holding that because of the im-
portance of "familial bonds" procedural due process was required prior to finding such bonds in
paternity suits); Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 262-63 (1970) ("The extent to which procedural
due process must be afforded the [defendant] is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss."), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath,
341 US 123,168 (1951) (Frankfurter concurring).
134 See text accompanying note 86.
135 Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 339 (1963), quoting Betts v Brady, 316 US 455, 462
(1942) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to appoint counsel
to indigent criminal defendants, a decision later overruled by Gideon).
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Because due process rights are determined by surrounding
circumstances, indigent rights to state-funded BWS experts should at
least be permissible on a case-by-case basis to address those instances
where the individual interests at stake are particularly great, such as
proving self-defense to a homicide charge.
2. The state's interest.
The state's interest in funding BWS expert testimony is likewise
equivalent to that asserted in the criminal context of Ake, which simi-
larly does not match the gravity of the individual's interest. n Ake pos-
ited that government interest in criminal contexts is "not substantial,"
in light of compelling interests of both the state and the individual in
accurate criminal dispositions. 37 Such an interest is not apparently lim-
ited by the type of expert utilized at trial and thus should extend to
the BWS context. In addition, the Ake Court rejected state economic
interests as significant where the obligation would be limited to the
provision of single psychiatrist;"1 presumably funding of BWS testi-
mony would be limited to a single expert as well.
In addition to those interests articulated in Ake, a state interest in
limiting successful due process challenges also weighs in favor of
state-funded BWS testimony. Any economic burden of hiring such an
expert might be tempered by the removal of the economic costs of
remand or a new trial. 39 The latter costs may be unusually prominent
in cases involving battered woman syndrome issues; while only 8.5
percent of homicide appeals result in discharge or new trial, one study
suggests that 40 percent of BWS homicide cases have resulted in re-
versals. '4 Yet another empirical examination found that among states
considering whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer
BWS testimony, 40 percent answered in the affirmative.''
3. Probable value and risk of erroneous deprivation.
Finally, an examination of Ake's third factor of probable value
and risk of deprivation of BWS testimony reveals strong parallels be-
tween BWS and psychiatry that demand state funding. Like psychia-
trists, BWS experts are utilized commonly in trials where the psycho-
logical issues are relevant: Such testimony has been admitted as evi-
136 See text accompanying notes 32-33.
137 470 US at 78-79.
138 See id at 78.
139 See Supreme Court, 99 Harv L Rev at 136 (cited in note 13).
140 Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 433 (cited in note 74), citing Joy A. Chapper and Roger A.
Hansom, Understanding Reversible Error in Criminal Appeals: Final Report 38 (National Center
for State Courts 1990).
141 Parrish, 11 Wis Women's L J at 84 (cited in note 84).
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dence in some degree in all 50 states,'' and 90 percent of states accept
BWS testimony in traditional self-defense homicide cases. '3 BWS ex-
perts can also fulfill functions identical to those stressed by the Ake
court as necessitating psychiatric testimony.'" The BWS expert would
be able to identify symptoms that would "elude lay witnesses, ' "s such
as the hypervigilance, cycles, and learned helplessness of the battered
woman as outlined by Walker." A BWS expert could further "trans-
late" a psychological diagnosis into "language with meaning" for the
trier of fact,47 connecting syndrome symptoms to legal terminology,
such as the "imminent fear" component of self-defense or specific in-
tent.
Just as the Ake court dwelt on the inexactitude of psychiatry and
diagnostic disagreements within the profession, BWS carries similar
differences and debate. '" Indeed, such criticism is crucial to a potential
argument against the parallel between psychiatry and BWS: BWS ex-
perts might not have a prosecutorial counterpart. In Ake, the Court
assumed that psychiatric testimony would be presented by both
sides;49 it emphasized that this battle of experts would lead jurors to
the "most accurate determination of truth."'" If empirical evidence
suggests that BWS experts are not countered by an equivalent prose-
cutorial witness, this might suggest to the jury that there is only one
right answer (as would a single psychiatrist) and would conflict with
the Ake Court's conception of why the defense expert is necessary.
However, if the prosecution is likely to present an opposing expert,
the BWS expert would again parallel the psychiatrist's advantage an-
nounced in Ake of knowing the "probative questions" to 'sk of the
state's expert."' Common sense suggests that no prosecutor would
permit any expert to testify to such a crucial issue as criminal intent
without providing her own opposing witness.'52 Indeed, with the nu-
142 See id at 83.
143 Id at 84.
144 As mentioned in Part I.A.1, these functions include psychiatrists' ability to gather facts,
interview, analyze, draw conclusions, and offer opinions. In addition, psychiatrists can (a) know
the probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their re-
sponses; (b) identify symptoms of insanity that elude the layperson; and (c) translate medical di-
agnosis into language with meaning for the trier of fact. See Ake, 470 US at 81. See text accom-
panying notes 36-37.
145 Ake,470 US at 81.
146 See Walker, Battered Woman Syndrome at 176-77,126-27,116-18 (cited in note 67). See
Part I.B.
147 Ake, 470 US at 81.
14s See note 65.
149 See 470 US at 84.
150 Id at 81.
151 Id.
152 Indeed, a few scholars have suggested ways in which prosecutors may utilize BWS evi-
dence. See generally Paula Finley Mangum, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evi-
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merous academic critics of the battered woman syndrome itself153 it is
highly probable that any opposing witness, even if not trained in BWS
specifically, could criticize the scientific methodology of its theoretical
conclusions.'"
B. Application of Ake Factors
In addition to the balancing test, the Ake Court enumerated fac-
tors making it more likely that a specific defendant's mental state is a
substantial issue warranting state funding for indigents; some of
these factors may be generalized to BWS testimony to determine
when state funding is required for a specific defendant. For example,
one factor contemplated by the Ake Court was whether insanity (as
diagnosed by the psychiatric expert) was the sole defense offered.'5'
Specific to BWS, state funding should be required when the battered
woman syndrome is the exclusive defense offered;"5' the likelihood of
state funding should also increase where BWS evidence is the sole
link to self-defense, since this comports with the theme of "crucial"
evidence ' s that seems to justify the relevance of this factor."" The state
may carry a greater responsibility to fund BWS expert testimony
when other psychiatrists have suggested the presence of such a mental
state in the defendant.'6° Finally, jurisdictions should be more willing to
provide BWS expert testimony when a defendant carries the burden
of production on an issue, 61 and the testimony is thus more important
to a successful defense.
dence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 BC Third World L J 593 (1999) (ex-
ploring ways in which BWS expert testimony can be utilized to prosecute domestic violence);
Sarah Crippin Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to the Adverse Examina-
tion Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v. Hennum, 74 Minn L
Rev 1023, 1026 (1990) (arguing that BWS expert testimony by the defense should be countered
by an adverse examination of a prosecutorial expert).
153 See note 65.
154 See id. The expert would also be free to criticize the case-specific diagnosis of the defen-
dant.
155 See Part I.A.2.
156 See 470 US at 86.
157 See, for example, Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 714 (rejecting defendant's request to obtain a
state-funded BWS expert to assist in development of an insanity defense).
158 See Evans, 648 NE2d at 968 (permitting BWS expert testimony "crucial" to demonstrat-
ing why the unarmed approach of a batterer could elicit a lethal response from a battered
spouse).
159 See note 94 for examples of cases where BWS was the exclusive link to self-defense. See
also Maguigan, 140 U Pa L Rev at 400 (cited in note 74).
160 This corresponds with the conclusion of the Ake court that multiple psychiatrists had de-
scribed his condition as severe, and therefore psychiatric assistance was more likely to be crucial
to the defense. See 470 US at 86. For a case example, see Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 712-13 (describing
how a court-appointed medical doctor concluded upon examination that defendant had a mental
illness).
161 The Ake Court believed that the burden of production upon a defendant pleading insan-
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Even if such factors are not met, either individually or as a group,
BWS expert funding still may be permissible based on Ake's own
qualifier that it expressed no opinion on whether any factors (indi-
vidually or in combination) are necessary to require state funding.'62
Indeed, subsequent judicial interpretations of Ake have exclusively
utilized its balancing test and ignored these additional factors when
considering state responsibility for BWS experts.' '
C. Scope of Indigent Right to BWS Expert
Both an analysis of caselaw and Ake's balancing test/relevant fac-
tors suggest that defendants are entitled to some form of psychiatric
review in which BWS can be examined and/or diagnosed." Since the
Ake Court emphasized the defendant's mental state "at the time of
the offense,'"'05 state-funded BWS testimony should also focus on the
time of the offense. Thus, BWS testimony should be funded to inform
fact-finding regarding intent at the time of the crime but denied when
utilized to address defendant's mental state at other times. Conse-
quently, claims of self-defense or action under duress would entitle the
indigent defendant to a state-sponsored BWS expert, because such
claims contest the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime;
BWS testimony would inform whether the defendant felt reasonable
fear at the time of the crime or whether the defendant's mental state
was coercively influenced by another at the time of the offense. For
example, both Evans and Dunn funded BWS testimony to establish
defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense; '66 the Evans ex-
pert addressed the defendant's intent as a killer, while the Dunn ex-
pert examined the defendant's intent as an aider and abettor of the
crime of homicide. In addition, both Ledford and Aucoin recognized
the ability of BWS testimony to address homicidal intent, although
both denied funds based on previous examination opportunities.'6
In contrast, the use of BWS testimony to establish other states of
mind outside of intent at the time of the crime would not be permit-
ted." For example, utilizing BWS to explain why a defendant has lied
in order to bolster credibility impermissibly addresses her mental state
ity also contributed to the necessity of expert services. See 470 US at 86.
162 See id at 86 n 12.
163 All of the cases applying the Ake standard to BWS evidence relied solely upon the bal-
ancing test. See Part II.B.
164 See Parts HI.A and III.B.
165 470 US at 83.
166 See Dunn, 963 F2d at 313; Evans, 648 NE2d at 968-69.
167 See Ledford, 333 SE2d at 657; Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 714.
163 For example, in cases where defendants attempt to establish remorse or credibility, or in
family law and divorce contexts, BWS testimony would not be permitted because any intent is
unrelated to the time of an offense.
2002] 2053
The University of Chicago Law Review
at the time she lied, rather than at the time of the offense for which
she stands accused. BWS testimony was not permitted in Dannels to
support credibility that went to the defendant's mental state for a
statement made after the crime had occurred.'
69
Prior caselaw also raises the question of whether the provision of
a BWS expert requires funding for a general psychiatrist who under-
stands BWS theory, or a specific BWS specialist.'70 How thorough must
the expert's BWS knowledge be to meet the demands of the Ake re-
quirements? Indigent defendants seeking to argue mental state at the
time of the offense clearly are entitled at a minimum to a general psy-
chiatrist capable of diagnosing BWS. Both prior caselaw and prag-
matic concerns indicate that such a provision is all that is necessary to
comport with state responsibilities under Ake;'" there is no require-
ment to fund a psychiatrist who specializes in BWS.
In rejecting state funding for BWS expert testimony, Ledford and
Aucoin reasoned that an opportunity for examination by a general
psychiatrist, able to diagnose BWS, was sufficient expert provision.,7
Any broader right suggests pragmatic difficulties under the Ake
analysis: It would be both expensive and difficult to obtain psychiatric
experts specializing in the exact form of mental illness from which a
defendant claims to suffer. Note that the Court did not provide Ake
the right to a psychiatrist specializing in paranoid schizophrenia but
merely one capable of rendering such a diagnosis.'" Similarly, limiting
the provision of a BWS expert to a psychiatrist who endorses the
BWS theory and is capable of diagnosing the syndrome sufficiently
protects the individual liberty interest, while limiting state labor and
financial burdens.
Finally, as was the case in Ake,'74 states should be able to imple-
ment the selection process of providing a BWS expert as they see fit.
Any rights in the selection process for BWS experts should not ex-
pand beyond those provided in Ake, where the Court denied that de-
fendants had any right to choose a psychiatrist of their personal liking
or receive funds to hire the same. 75
169 See 734 P2d at 193 (refusing to allow BWS testimony to explain her reasons for lying af-
ter the crime about the source of a bruise).
170 See, for example, Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 714 (denying defendant a right to an "advocate"
after the state offered to provide a court-appointed BWS expert).
171 See Ake, 470 US at 83 ("This is not to say ... that the indigent defendant has a constitu-
tional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.").
See also text accompanying note 43.
172 See text accompanying notes 101-11.
173 See Ake, 470 US at 83.
174 See id.
175 See text accompanying notes 42-43. Such a right to choose one's expert was likewise
dismissed by the Aucoin court in the BWS context. See Aucoin, 756 SW2d at 713.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has determined that government is responsi-
ble for providing "meaningful access to justice.''7 6 Just as psychiatric
assistance is a "basic tool""7 to achieving this end, so too must battered
woman syndrome experts be added to the toolbox. The application of
Ake's balancing and relevant factor tests to BWS defendants demon-
strates that expert testimony should be provided. To preserve individ-
ual liberty while minimizing state burdens, indigent access to a BWS
expert should be limited to testimony regarding defendant's mental
state at the time of the crime. The expert should be familiar with, but
does not have to specialize in, battered woman syndrome theory. Ad-
ditionally, states should retain the discretion to select an appropriate
expert. While true, as Justice Frankfurter proclaimed, that a state need
not equalize economic conditions,"' the "actualities" to which the law
addresses itself suggest that BWS testimony is a commonly accepted,
and often crucial, factor in protecting the individual liberties of do-
mestic abuse victims. Accordingly, the contingencies of life"9 must not
always be mirrored in those of law.
176 Britt v North Carolina, 404 US 226,227 (1971).
177 See id.
178 See Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12,23 (1956) (Frankfurter concurring).
179 See id.
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